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Abstract
Since networks and computing systems are vital components of today's life, it is of utmost importance to
endow them with the capability to survive physical and logical faults, as well as malicious or deliberate
attacks. When the information system is obtained by federating pre-existing local systems, a
methodology is needed to integrate security policies and mechanisms under a uniform structure.
Therefore, in building distributed information systems, a methodology for analysis, design and
implementation of security requirements of data and processes is essential for obtaining
mutual trust between cooperating organizations. Moreover, when the information system is
built as a cooperative set of e-services, security is related to the type of data, to the sensitivity
context of the cooperative processes and to the security characteristics of the communication
paradigms.
The CoopSIS (Cooperative Secure Information Systems) project aims to develop methods and tools for
the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of secure and survivable distributed information
systems of cooperative type, in  particular with experimentation in the Public Administration Domain.
This paper presents the basic issues of a methodology being conceived to build a trusted
cooperative environment, where data sensitivity parameters and security requirements of
processes are taken into account. The milestones phases of the security development methodology in
the context of this project are illustrated.
Keywords
Security, Survivability, Policies, Collaborative Information Systems, Web Services.
1. Introduction
The CoopSIS  (Cooperative Secure Information Systems) project, framed in the context of
National and Regional Projects in Italy regarding e-government and security, aims to develop
methods and tools for the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of "survivable"
distributed information systems. Since networks and computing systems are vital components
of today's life, it is of utmost importance to provide them with the capability to survive
physical and logical faults, as well as malicious or  deliberate attacks.
To achieve this target, the project groups together researchers and developers in two areas: distributed
information systems for Public Administrations and security. From their marriage, we expect to have a
global systematic and efficient approach to help in the design and deployment of available and secure
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systems. Recently, the widespread use of information technology and the availability of networking
services have enabled new types of applications, characterized by several geographically distributed
interacting organizations. We refer to the term Cooperative Information Systems (CoopIS) to denote
distributed information systems that are employed by users of different organizations under a common
goal (Mylopoulos 1998).  In this paper we refer to recent extensions of the concept of CoopIS, namely
e-applications (Mecella 2001), consisting of e-services provided by different organizations on the net.
Our approach to the security problem in CoopIS is based on two concepts:
- a system description based on formal policy, that is, a formal specification of the security and
dependability properties expected for the target system; this yields to a multi-level approach, where
the designer can specify both high-level properties or specific fine-grain controls;
- a formal system description, that consists of an accurate model of information system components
and interconnections in terms of security and dependability features and parameters.
Based on the description of the desired policy and of the target system, it is possible to perform the
following actions:
1. To build a model useful to evaluate the global/local survivability of the system, with respect to the
desired properties specified in the system policy.
2. To automatically or semi-automatically derive configuration rules for the system to implement the
desired security policy. If derivation is impossible, due to lack of security features in the target
system, the missing features will be automatically suggested to the developers by monitoring  in
real-time the behaviour of the current system and to compare this behaviour with the policy, in
order to identify discrepancies from the expected behaviour that could signal either problems in
the implementation or unknown/unpredicted attacks or faults.
Since these two are quite difficult tasks to be performed in a generalized way, the methodology we are
developing within the CoopSIS project will deal mainly with the following specific application
contexts, which are of particular importance in cooperative information systems, that is:
- middleware for secure and dependable systems (investigation will explore both CORBA-based
paradigms and the more recent SOAP/UDDI approach to distributed applications), also when used
to encapsulate legacy or COTS components;
- distributed computing environments of the GRID type;
- classical Internet architectures (web services, DBMS, firewalls, IDS);
- role-based authorization systems for enterprise data access and control;
- protection of XML objects, such as those used for electronic documents or interoperable
transactions and data exchanges between different domains.
The paper is organized as follows. After a short review of the methodology phases, presented
in Sect. 1.1, in Section 2, we frame our work in the context of research on security distributed
systems. In Section 3, we present the requirements of the methodology. Finally, in Section 4
we discuss the results expected from the application of the methodology by presenting its
envisioned use in cooperative Information Systems in the Public Administration context.
1.1 Overview  of the CoopSIS methodology
 The security development methodology is composed of four phases.
1. Phase 1 deals with the design of an XML-based language for formal security policy
specification and formal system description, and with the development of the related support
tools (parsers, translators).
2. Based on the provided description of quantitative and qualitative parameters provided by Phase
1, Phase 2 is a design phase defining models and tools to evaluate global and local system
properties, and to suggest appropriate system (re-)configuration actions when the desired
properties cannot be obtained using the available systems. This may range from simple
automatic configuration of existing components (e.g., configuring access control lists on a
router to block illegal access) to relevant architectural changes (e.g. addition of firewalls or
redundant hardware components).
3. Phase 3 deals with system monitoring, to detect failures and attacks, to report them and - if
desired - to automatically activate appropriate countermeasures and re-design system security.
4. Phase 4 is the implementation, context-specific phase. It gives guidelines instantiated on a
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specific context, to implement the policies and designed mechanism within the selected
application contexts. Contexts studied in our case are Public Administrations and the Italian
plan for e-government. More generally, for each context, Phase 4 provides models of the
dependability and security properties of the system, with the associated qualitative and
quantitative evaluation. Then, Phase 4 develops some of the security mechanisms (including the
needed infrastructures) that have been found as missing in a given application context.
Although there are several dependencies between the four phases, there is no strict sequencing of them.
Several loops and feedback steps are included among the steps, in order to verify the results of each
steps against the requirements provided by the previous ones and to insert correction actions.
The project wherein the methodology is being developed spans over two years, and considers
application in the Public Administration domain, using healthcare, welfare, and, in general, e-
government applications, where security mechanisms have to be developed for web services-based
Portals oriented to providing e-services to citizens and to enterprises distributed on regional areas.
A final demonstrator will be set up, covering the whole chain envisaged by the CoopSIS project (formal
description, evaluation, configuration, and  monitoring) in one or two specific areas (e.g. web-based
ICT architectures, GRID, e-document workflow).
2. The context: security and cooperation
We are witnessing the construction of networks of large-scale, complex and automated information
systems, which support day-by-day activities in several vital functions.
For this reason, these systems can be regarded as critical infrastructures which need to survive attacks
and intrusions as  well as failures of components or subsystems. They integrate previously disjoint
systems to provide services, which have become critical in our everyday life, such as services to citizens
or organizations. Under no circumstances a complete unavailability is acceptable for these
infrastructures. Therefore concepts like security and survivability have become crucial requirements of
current information systems, and it is foreseeable that their importance will increase in the future at a
fast pace.
In the US, this area has been considered to be particularly urgent, even before the events of September
11, as evidenced in the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (President 2002).
The special issue of IEEE Computer - August 2000 is another symptom of this urgency (Jones 2000). Its
importance has also been found to be critical for the success of the Grid initiative, that is, the
replacement for the Internet,  both in the US and in the EU. The European Community has become
convinced of the great need to define and plan a broader and more integrated set of security and
dependability-related activities for the IST 6th Framework Program (EU 2002) and than in FWP5
((Wilikens 1998)). (See the European Dependability Initiative forum at http://deppy.jrc.it/, where the
term Dependability (Laprie 1995, Laprie 2001) is used by the EU to encompass several system
attributes, such as reliability, availability, safety, security, survivability).
In general, the information infrastructure, and thus many of the dependability problems that will exist in
years to come, will be global in nature. Thus strong cooperation is envisaged between the EU and US on
dependability. Negotiations are being conducted within the framework of the EU-US Science &
Technology agreement, via a number of joint workshops. This situation is very well clearly summarized
by the welcome message of the DSN-2002 general chair, Dr. Jaynarayan H. Lala: "The traditional
concerns of the dependability community (e.g., inadvertent faults, errors, and failures) have now been
enlarged by the massive connectivity provided by the Internet to include malicious exploitation of
imperfect systems and networks and intentional cyber-attacks on them. How can we build systems that
are not vulnerable to such threats - systems that users can depend upon in defence, transportation,
financial, and e-commerce sectors? These questions have taken on added importance" (DSN is the IEEE
international conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, with an history of more than 30
editions). In order to fully respond to these problems, systematic and integrated approaches are needed
to enhance both dependability and security of systems; the MAFTIA project (MAFTIA 2001) is a first
example of cooperation between researchers of these areas.
2.1 Formal specification and Modelling
Many modern approaches use a specification language to describe security policies and/or fault tolerant
strategies and to build models needed for a-priori dependability evaluation. This is important for
application in real-life systems, where it is often impossible to propose a complete rebuild of the whole
system. On the contrary, attention must be paid to systems built using Commercial Off-The Shelf
(COTS) components. Hence, a proper approach is to formally specify policies and strategies, and later
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translate them on the target systems.
The elements of the language are basic "mechanisms" that need to be appropriately configured (and
eventually reconfigured in presence of a detected misbehaviour) to implement a given policy. A similar
experience has been done in the EC project DepAude, and its ancestor Tiran (Botti 1999), where an
interpreted language has been defined and implemented to distribute a set of tasks over a set of nodes,
with an associated list of reconfiguration actions in the presence of detected malfunctioning.
The availability of a specification document for the security policy and the dependability strategy can
also be exploited to simplify the construction of models from the early stages of the design, as
advocated, for example, in (Vemuri 1999) and as initially experimented in (Bobbio 2001).
Some efforts have been done to develop a formal model of a target system and apply analytical metrics
to assess its weaknesses (Jha2001, Swiler 1998 and Ortalo 1999). Nevertheless, it is clear that no single
analysis and modelling approach can successfully cope with the growing complexity of distributed
information systems. A unifying methodology is needed to cope with the different aspects involved in
information systems security. In particular, when information systems are constructed as federations of
local existing systems, a method is needed to integrate existing policies on data and application
protection with the smallest impact on the overall system operations and user confidence and trust on
the security procedures.
A critical point is that current methods have no control on how many different security components act
in combination. In (Helsinger 2001) an approach is described that combines modelling and
experimentation but the failure modes of complex networked systems appear not well understood nor
adequately modelled yet. A multi-formalism multi-solution (MFMS) approach is very appealing, since a
designer may choose the formalism that best suits each part of the overall model and then combine the
sub-models in order to obtain one large heterogeneous model. Some results in this direction have been
achieved within the Mobius project (Clark 2001).
For security aspects, the successful development of automatic policy systems clearly requires formal
languages able to describe:
- multiple involved entities (users, devices, services, ...) as well as their complex interactions
- available mechanisms (protocols, authentication and authorization methods, trust management
techniques, ...) and their potentially complex configuration
- required actions in case of attacks or vulnerability detection (e.g., alert, service blocking, automatic
system reconfiguration).
Current research in this area include the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) working groups IPSP
(IP Security Policy) (Blaze 1999,) RAP (Resource Allocation Protocol) (Durham 2000), and POLICY
(Moore 2001). The Policy Core Information Model (PCIM) (Moore 2001) and (Moore 2002), defined
by the POLICY WG, tries to define a language for general policy description. A relevant alternative is
the Ponder (Damianou 2000) language, developed at the Imperial College in London.
Looking at more security-specific languages, the SecPol Sloman (2000) project, for security policy
management in distributed systems, and the KeyNote (Blaze 1999) system, focused on trust
management, are key examples. Recently, the international research community has outlined the
Extensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray 2000) as a promising base to define languages able to fulfil
the necessary expressive power. The Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) (Pilz
2001 and (Godik 2002) and the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (Hallam-Baker 2002)
projects are among the most interesting examples of XML based languages for security policy
definition.
2.2 Performance Evaluation
In the performance evaluation field, the study of the dependability of systems is considered a difficult
topic due to the need of modelling together the hardware, the particular hw/sw mechanisms, the
interactions among them, the presence of faults and eventually of the error and failure chain, and the
need to drop the exponential distribution assumptions for delays and to identify specific ad-hoc indexes.
Moreover, although security is considered as one of the attributes of dependability (a mix of integrity
and availability with respect to authorized actions, together with confidentiality), performance studies
on dependability often do not consider security aspects, and vice versa.
Fugini, Mezzanzanica                                                   Security Methodology for Cooperative Information Systems
2.3 Monitoring
Continuous and cost-effective monitoring of survivability mechanisms must be performed in order to
achieve survivability goals. In fact, the deployment of complex distributed applications based on COTS
hardware and software components, as well as legacy subsystems of cooperative environments,
seriously affects the possibility of meeting survivability requirements. Actually,  these components are
usually developed neglecting availability, reliability and security. Therefore, without efficient
architectural and methodological solutions, large survivable infrastructures are almost impossible to
obtain. In this context, the capability to detect errors or component failures, the ability to correctly
diagnose the status or health of components (including entire legacy subsystems), and the availability of
quick and intelligent reconfiguration and fault treatment strategies are fundamental issues to be
addressed. In particular, fault diagnosis depends on whether the fault is intentional or unintentional. The
former case requires intrusion detection techniques (Deswarte 1991, Sobirey 1996) while the latter can
be achieved through traditional fault diagnosis techniques (Lin 1990, Iyer 1990, Sosnowski 1994).
2.4 Application Contexts
Developers typically build systems with little or no attention to their security. They try to incorporate
these features in the system afterwards. The result of this approach is the adoption of partial and
inadequate solutions, which are vendor-specific and poorly integrated with the application.
In general, more efforts have been put in the security field, rather than in the availability one. For
example, application security is based either on secure message formats, such as the S/MIME (Ramsdell
1999) format for protection of e-mail messages or electronic documents, or secure channels, such as e-
commerce sensitive web traffic protected through the SSL or TLS protocol (Harkins 1998). With
respect to network-level security mechanisms, the IPsec protocol (Dierks 1999, Kent 1998) is the
standard architecture, used to set up both secure VPN (Virtual Private Network) and end-to-end secure
channels at IP level. Integrity of the network infrastructure itself is also of primary relevance: protection
and control technologies based on proxies and/or firewalls (Cheswick 1994) and Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) are the classical solution to avoid unauthorized use of communication resources.
Only recent years have seen efforts towards standard architectural approaches to security. One
remarkable project is the Common Data Security Architecture (CDSA) project which aims at defining a
middleware infrastructure capable of providing a set of security services in a transparent way. In
addition to S/MIME, generic data protection is usually achieved with specific standard formats; here the
choice is between Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) (Housley 1999) and XML-based standards,
such as XML-DSIG (Eastlake 2002) and XML-encryption (still in a draft status).
More articulated efforts have been done in the context of object-oriented distributed systems, such as
the CORBA-SEC solution for CORBA architectures. Also the need for fault tolerance in CORBA has
been long advocated by the scientific community. This has led to the specification of Fault Tolerant
CORBA by OMG, the Object Management Group (CORBA 2000). A number of projects have been
activated, both in the academia and in the industry, which aim at developing fault tolerant CORBA
platforms. These systems incorporate fault tolerance management in the ORB and/or in additional
software layers. Eternal (Narasimhan 2002) is an example of such systems.
Communication between replication groups is done using connection groups. The Eternal system adds
fault tolerance to CORBA applications by replicating objects and incorporating a number of
mechanisms to maintain replication consistency. For distributed computing environments (such as the
GRID initiative) security issues are extremely important (Ferrari 1999, Butler 2000). Such systems
generate dynamic aggregations of computational resources that are heterogeneous both in the security
architecture and in the user or administrative domain they belong to.
Moreover, reconfiguration (to achieve survivability) is often achieved via distributed plug-ins.
Unfortunately this technology introduces a source of complexity in security, by allowing users to
change at run-time the set of services provided by the system by means of modules downloaded from
local and remote repositories. The Java2 platform defines a security architecture (Gong 1998) that
allows developers both to define access policies for pre-existing resources and to add new resources.
This architecture leverages symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic standards and is compatible with
the X.509 digital certification standard.
2.5 Cooperative Information Systems and Security
In order to integrate features of data and process security in a CoopIS/e-application we have
to handle:
- security of data handled within one e-service;
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- security of data exchanged among cooperating e-services and therefore of the cooperation
among individually trusted e-services.
The methodology to be designed needs to extend the traditional waterfall methods by
providing a set of steps that, starting from the system and user security requirements and
policies, brings to the development of a secure, or trusted, CoopIS. In the remainder of the
paper, we make a set of assumptions about the information system that are now shortly listed
(for a complete description of the cooperative information systems assumption we refer to
(Fugini 2002)).
1) First, we assume that each e-service has been designed according to internal security
requirements and policies and is therefore a trusted or secure (set of) process(es). The focus
of the methodology is on data and process security during the cooperation among processes.
2) Secondly, we consider that organizations cooperating in CoopIS/e-applications are of two
types:
- trusted organizations: data transmission occurs among organizations which trust each
other in a network due to organizational reasons (e.g., homogeneous work groups in a
departmental structure, or supply-chain relationships among organizations in a virtual
enterprise);
- untrusted/external organizations: data are transmitted among cooperating entities in
general, possibly accessing external data sources. Every time mutual knowledge among
organizations participating in CoopIS/e-applications is not given in advance, mechanisms
are needed to ensure that mutual trust be established dynamically, during cooperative
process executions.
Trust comprises mainly two aspects:
· the sensitivity of data being managed within an organization unit, and
· a secure information exchange to guarantee sensitive information.
Sensitivity concerns both correct authentication of cooperating organizations and the process of
guaranteeing that only authorized organizations can read, use, and generate data in the cooperative
process. To guarantee sensitivity of information, security technologies and mechanisms must be used,
e.g., based on the use of digital certificates and signatures, to allow the cooperating organizations to
establish a secure communication environment (secure information exchange).
3. The methodology
In this section, we describe the phases of a methodology that integrates CoopIS application
requirements with security aspects from the early phases of system design. It considers the foundations
on security and survivability overviewed in the previous section and proposes a set of phases
specifically oriented to develop secure cooperative systems, prevalently based on web services
technology, that exchange data and cooperate in a controlled way.
First of all, let us introduce the new scenario that involve web services (Curbera 2002) taking
into account a conceptual architecture proposed for web services named Service Oriented
Architecture (SOA) illustrated in Fig.1, where three main actors appear:
– Service provider: who creates and holds the service;
– Service directory: who publishes, on service provider’s request, the service in order to
publicize it;
– Service requestor: who needs for a service and uses the service directory to find the best
service matching its requisite. Once found, the service requestor directly connects to the
service provider in order to invoke (and so use) the service.
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Fig. 1 Service oriented architecture
In this scenario, Web Services can be invoked by an application, a component, and another web-
component. In such a way, several web-components cooperate to perform an application, e.g., to search
all the data regarding a citizen’s curriculum when supporting him/her to find a job over a set of
territorial information systems (the Provinces systems, and the regional system). This means that a web-
component that needs the cooperation of another web-component has to cooperate with another one
considering several features: availability of a channel, convenience, reliability and security.
Security problems regard authentication of the partners that cooperate (e.g., the province and the
regional system that exchange regarding a citizen),  data base security, network security, and also node
survival in order to preserve the transactional properties over the distributed execution of a long web
transaction.
3.1 Phase 1- Foundations: Design of a Description Language for
Formal Policies
The first phase of the methodology consists in laying down the foundations and policies needed by the
planned development activities of the cooperative system. This phase targets the following objectives:
a) Analyze in detail the dependability and security problems and mechanism of the application
contexts:
- middleware for secure and dependable systems (both CORBA-based paradigms and the
more recent SOAP/UDDI approach to distributed applications), also when used to
encapsulate legacy or COTS components;
- distributed computing environments of the GRID type, augmented with security and
reconfiguration features;
- classical Internet architectures (web services, DBMS, firewalls, IDS), including role-based
authorization systems for enterprise data access;
- protection of XML objects, such as those used for electronic documents, interoperable
transactions or data exchanges between different domains.
b) Build on current knowledge and results of item a)  to define two multilevel languages, one for
system description (behavioural and topological) and one for policy specification (description
of general high-level properties as well as context-specific fine-grain controls).
c) Develop the languages to describe and to evaluate the dependability and security of the
systems, and design/identify architectures and mechanisms supporting the implementation of
policies.
d)  Define the foundations of the basic mechanisms needed to monitor the system activity and
detect failures (that is, violation of the policies).
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The phase is divided into areas according to the specific application contexts to which it is related.
TRUSTED AND RELIABLE COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS
- Identification of security requirements and policies of a CoopIS, where the sensitivity of user and
system data (mainly databases and business data, such as customer directories or collections of
documents) is strictly classified and a core-business data is individuated.
- Investigation of the survivability properties of various architectures for the integration of security
services and cooperation infrastructures based on Web Services, with the target to create a Secure
Service Oriented Architecture (SSOA). The SSOA must be designed specifically to support a
Business Community defined as a "virtual community" of users that share a common business area
and need to interact digitally. Such a Business Community can be instantiated in many different
contexts ranging from Public Administrations to private organizations. In addition to dependability
and security, the requirements of a SSOA are the pervasivity, interoperability, openness,
extensibility and service provider independence. To accomplish this task the phase studies existing
architectures, standards and technologies for access control to local and wide area services. This
study includes the analysis of the models and of the existing solutions and the analysis of the match
between such solutions and the formal requirements specified by the security policies.
DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING GRID-TYPE ARCHITECTURES
- Evaluation of the survivability features of different grid-types environments; for example, the
HARNESS system seems to be the most attractive one, due to its easy dynamic reconfigurability.
This evaluation requires in-depth study of the security and dependability problems for grid
computers with dynamic reconfiguration capabilities built on top of the Java2 platform and Web
Services technologies.
- General evaluation and modeling of the features of security and dynamic reconfiguration
mechanisms existing in some environments, such as in Java2/JSSE.
XML DATA PROTECTION
- Evaluation and modeling of secure document management services, with reference to structured
documents, possibly containing multimedia components. Analysis of possible document
transformations that change the content and that allow for different levels of security is also
included.
- Features and applicability of the XML Digital Signature and Encryption formats for generic data
protection.
CLASSICAL INTERNET APPLICATIONS
- Analysis of the features of the most common Internet protocols, devices and services, at different
abstraction levels. This study provides the functional and quantitative models of the survivability of
Internet  architectures by analyzing the features of routers, firewalls, and application servers, as well
as those of standard security protocols and formats (such as IPsec, SSL, S/MIME).
To exploit a useful system description language and formal policy definition language, the methodology
has to accomplish the following tasks:
- Selection of a policy definition language, focused on expressiveness and completeness; in
particular, languages such as XML-based languages, XACML (Extensible Access Control Markup
Language) and SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language), can be considered, since they are
particularly attractive for their extensibility.
- Evaluation of the emerging models in the security field, in order to have a complete background to
use a proper language syntax - multilevel policy extensions to take into account aspects typical of
various contexts (network, application, and middleware layers). For example, this would allow also
specification of policies for document exchanges at the application level for secure document
management services.
- Definition of a language that includes security policies and dependability aspects. A particular
attention has to be paid to the definition of performance, dependability and security parameters.
Considering for example the development of XML dialects, we have to evaluate the required
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extensions or modifications to an existing policy language, or its development ex-novo.
- Definition of a language to describe topology and features of distributed architectures for the target
application contexts, with respect to those aspects relevant for survivability analysis.
3.2 Phase 2 – Design
In the design phase, system security data (such as password, security files, log files,
authentication data and so on) are designed, and ways for exchanging data in a secure way are
identified. This phase has to deal with the design of the security infrastructure model for
interoperability among elements of the cooperative information system. The following areas
have to be tackled with.
IDENTIFICATION AND CONFIGURATION OF SURVIVABILITY MECHANISMS
The tasks to be performed in this area are as follows:
- Identification of procedures and strategies for correct reconfiguration of the infrastructure that
allows for a better behaviour in reaction to failures of components, attacks or overloads. For
example, various reflective systems and fault tolerance structures are evaluated, having the
capability to dynamically adapt their behaviour based on information system user requirements and
fault conditions.
- Monitoring and reconfiguration strategies compared against a given survivability level- definition
of strategies for correct reconfiguration of the infrastructure and validation of such strategies.
MODELLING AND MODEL EVALUATION
- Use of formalisms (such as Workflow Models) to express security features, constraints,  and policy
choice support.
- Extension of formalisms to deal with the possibility of importing and exporting features.
- Derivation of a security evaluation schema for cooperative systems described according to the
defined language. By schema, we mean the identification of the main security modelling
components, the definition of their relations into the aggregation of the components into the overall
system model, and the identification of the security indexes of interest to define an integrated
approach for the compositional construction of security models, leading to the development of a set
of security classes in an object-oriented language.
SURVIVABLE SECURE ARCHITECTURES
- Development of a model and a methodology for secure web-based information systems, including
trusted data exchange in cooperative environments.
- Definition of an architecture for the integration of a Public Key Infrastructure with a Service
Registry, leading to the identification of those PKI components that can be integrated in a service
registry such as UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration), and organization of the
components interaction in such a way to preserve the chain of trust that ensures the correct work of
PKIs.
- Definition of an Architecture for the protection of transport protocols for Service Oriented
Architectures, to enable authentication, encryption and fault tolerance mechanisms in the transport
protocols of Service Oriented Architectures, such as SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol).
- For grid-types system, design of plug-in repositories that exploit PKI and secure channel technology
to certify the source and guarantee the integrity of downloaded plug-ins, as well as a bridge to
permit controlled integration of non-secure modules in the secure grid architecture.
3.3 Phase 3 – System Monitoring
System monitoring means the observation of the cooperative system during its operation in order to find
the best and most efficient solutions to security of data, devices, and communication channels. Different
monitoring approaches have to be studied and then reconciled during an experimentation phase.
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In general, this activity is related to identification of mechanisms for error detection and accurate
diagnosis of malfunctions of (COTS or legacy) components of distributed infrastructures. This includes
also intrusions, overload and congestion detection. A reasonable possibility consists in starting from the
threshold-based mechanisms that have been defined in other contexts, such as for diagnostic purposes in
embedded systems. Despite diagnosis in the context of large COTS and legacy-based distributed
systems is a different problem, “threshold” is a good approach since it allows to establish a set of
minimal requirements  to be fulfilled by the security mechanisms. The threshold can be established
more efficiently if system observation is performed along time.
A different approach can be studied. By building on well-known intrusion-detection principles (sniffing,
log analysis, and so on), the methodology can monitor the security of a system. In current intrusion-
detection systems (IDS), this is a difficult task because the IDS module has to detect illegal or unusual
system behaviour, with no formal definition of what is legal and normal. In our methodology, the
formal policy specification allows one to be very accurate and to detect misbehaviours by comparing
the actual activity with the one specified in the policy. Obviously, the more specific a policy (e.g.,
accept only ICMP packets from node X to node Y) the more effective the monitoring effort.
In the monitoring phase of the methodology, the work concentrates on the fast matching problem, that is
how to quickly find if some data (log, network packet) match a set of rules. Approaches based on BDD
(Binary Decision Diagrams) seem to be very promising in this respect
3.4 Phase 4 – Context-specific Implementation
Implementation and experimentation of techniques and architectures designed in the previous are
implemented and instantiated on specific contexts. A policy-based framework has to be developed to
simplify this task and provide a consistent background for all the considered facets and application
contexts.
This framework will provide the basic functions for actual system implementation, and will generate a
common base format to interface the tools developed for various purposes inside the project. In fact
various tools can be employed, ranging from system simulation and evaluation engines to automatic
configurators, from monitors to specific dependability and security modules.
A common framework to specify and manage system description and policy definition has to be
developed. This requires the following steps:
- Implementation of the framework core engine. This mainly includes all necessary parsing functions
for formal system description and policy description languages specified in the first steps, and the
interfaces required to integrate and coordinate all the specific computational modules (evaluation,
configuration and monitoring). After parsing and checking the policies and the descriptions, they
will be translated to an intermediate internal format, to be used by all others modules of the
distributed framework.
- Design and development of the interfaces needed to integrate and coordinate security modules
developed by the other development groups for specific aspects of the application domain. Java
and/or Corba technologies will be used in the development of the framework, thanks to their
modularity and dynamic behaviour.
In general, the second step experiments the configuration and evaluation strategies identified in phase 1
of the methodology. For example, this will permit to define a composite validation strategy based on
different and complementary analytical, simulation and experimental methods for dealing with large
distributed systems. As a result, tools will be developed that permit to measure (in a quantitative or - at
least - qualitative way) the survivability of a system, given the policy defined for it.
A specific task is related to automatic configuration of security aspects. Starting from the formal system
and policy descriptions, tools have to be employed to automatically create the configuration rules for
elements studied in the first phase (e.g., ACL for routers, filters for firewalls and proxies, authorization
sets for web/DBMS servers), to be later applied automatically or manually. This is an important task,
because it is well-known that part of the security failures are due to human errors in system
configuration.
Based on the results of the steps, one or more monitoring systems are developed. Thanks to the formal
policy specification, a high level of accuracy can be achieved in misbehaviour detection by comparing
the actual activity with the one defined as acceptable in the system policy.
Specific activities are summarized according to the application area that they are related to.
TRUSTED AND RELIABLE COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS
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- Definition of mechanisms to manage redundancies, like redundant sensors for system monitoring,
for accurate diagnosis, for fast reconfigurations and state restoration.
- Implementation of the model developed for secure web-based information systems including trusted
data exchange in cooperative environments.
- Implementation, deployment and test of the conceptual architecture of a Security Server. The
techniques developed by the researchers involved in the definition of the multi-formalism approach
and the mechanisms developed by the project researchers involved in the monitoring activity will be
used to evaluate the survivability properties of the system.
- Implementation and evaluation of a pilot Secure Service Oriented Architecture building a prototypal
implementation of the architectures defined in the previous phase in such a way to evaluate the
feasibility and the performance of the solutions adopted.
- Implementation and evaluation of a prototypal architecture for user access to services across
organizations. The system will be integrated with the architecture developed in the previous item.
- Implementation of a security platform made of selected products and solutions for authentication,
access control, audit, communication to manage user data and system security data
- Implementation of a system based on COTS components to experiment and evaluate the results of
the research activities.
XML DATA PROTECTION
- Evaluation of the effects of faults derived from chosen transformations during documents
exchanges.
- Assessment of the capabilities of the designed security policy for electronic document security.
- Design and possible development of a policy-based e-document middleware, to take into account
policy requirements in the whole life of a document, including its exchange with foreign domains.
4. Results of the methodology
Upon completion of the methodology, the following results are expected for the considered application
contexts:
- creation of a framework (based on the languages defined in the first phase) to describe a cooperative
distributed system and to formally specify its security and dependability policy;
- availability of tools (integrated in the framework of the previous point) for automatic system
configuration or reconfiguration, for evaluation of its properties,  and for the monitoring of its
activities;
- availability of specific modules to augment the security and reliability of the target CoopIS
architecture.
A test bed will be set up to demonstrate the whole workflow of the framework (specification,
evaluation, configuration and monitoring) for a specific application domain. A prototype of applications
augmented with survivability features will be developed and tested as depicted in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2 CoopIS Testing
The methodology phases undergo a continuous feedback (Fig. 3) in order to evaluate the objectives
actually reached, as defined for each phase. More specifically, the languages, the models and the
architectures have to be documented in technical manual of the methodology, while the prototypes of
the software components (translators, evaluation and monitoring systems, ...)  must be integrated into a
demonstrator in the form of a suite of tools able to specify, evaluate, configure and monitor a distributed
architecture in the customer’s application context.
This methodology is  being experimented in a National Project regarding the integration of web portals
of local public administration (Provinces, Regions, Chambers of Commerce, Ministry of Welfare) in
Italy in some thematic areas such as the healthcare domain and the Welfare and Work Support Policies.
In fact, the development of ICT structures in enterprises and in Public Administrations (PA) requires
specialized security measures. The first tools able to reach this goal are the Security Policies, that is,
planning and technical documents written to set up in a formal way the behavior to be followed and the
measures to be undertaken in order to protect information systems. Whatever the type of activity and of
the system, large or small, public or private, security issues can not be ignored at no level: hence,
security issues have been accepted at the normative level by laws of the Italian State as well as at the
local (regional and provinces) level, as well as at the international level - where common criteria and
standards have been set up to evaluate system and application security.
The implementation, that is, the decision about the best way to design and realize a plan able to
guarantee adequate security levels, is still an open problem. Various guidelines exist trying to establish
core principles for professionals and managers; however, the compilation of a security plan always goes
through a set of basic steps: i)  the identification of assets and data to be protected, classified under
suitable risk classes; ii) the identification of goals, that is, the level where an organization wants to
pursue a policy of securization for its assets, accepting risk degrees and a certain effort to follow such
policy; iii) the implementation  and control phase, where the identified procedures are established
according to the existing laws and rules, according to the configuration  and nature of the system, and to
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Fig. 3 Cycles in the methodology
The methodology has to consider the context of Security Policies for administrative structures with
phases and tools able to collect security requirements and rules in the form of checklists. In particular,
the aim of work to be performed specifically in the e-government plan is to create a set of rules, laws
and standards regarding security, trying to compose different backgrounds (of business, administrative,
and technical type) to provide an overall view of the security matter useful to the creation  of a set of
effective policies.
PA are actually a particular context since most of services provided by PA have a deep dependence
from, and impact on, legal aspects of citizens’ lives and on the usual operation and performance of
companies and organizations. Besides the security requirements of a large company, PA have to
preserve their image and have to rule and govern the behaviour of their employees as well as of their
users in the use of their networked information systems. Hence, PA have to ensure an operativity
adherent to rules and laws, tackling problems such as the correct use of the digital signature and
certificates since the administrative acts need to have legal value according to current laws, have to
activate authentication and non repudiation systems for administrative transactions, to have to protect
sensitive data and so on. We just mention the forthcoming application regarding the Electronic Identity
Card and its security implications, that deserves a careful study of policies, attacks, mechanisms and
interoperability measures necessary to perform all identification processing correctly and in a secure
and under transaction survivable protocols.
5. Concluding remarks and discussion
The methodology presented in this paper has to consider the context of Security Policies for
administrative structures with phases and tools able to collect security requirements and rules in the
form of checklists. In particular, the aim of work to be performed in practical applications has to
balance benefits and drawbacks and this will be done by setting up two activities: 1) a lab where
security is evaluated in Cooperative Information Systems in the field of mobile and multichannel
systems; 2) within the context of the Italian E-Government plan in the context of the WorkFair Virtual
Network being developed in some Italian Areas.
The first activity consists in examining the security requirements of a CoopIS in networked PA
environments also based on wireless connections. A lab is being created to simulate a set of e-services
in the context of emergency, real-time systems and in financial applications to study the dynamic
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multichannel platforms.
The second activity consists in applying the methodology to the set of Web Services being developed
within the Portals for Employment constituting a support to the job e-market place being designed in
some Italian Regions for citizens and enterprises. The security aspects in such context are bound to the
interpretation of rules, laws and standards regarding security, trying to compose different backgrounds
(both organizational and technical) to provide an overall view of the security matter useful to the
creation  of a set of effective policies.
Public Administrations (PA) are actually a particular context since most of services provided by PA
have a deep dependence from, and impact on, legal aspects of citizens’ lives and on the usual operation
and performance of companies and organizations. Besides the security requirements of a large
company, PA have to preserve their image and have to rule and govern the behaviour of their employees
as well as of their users in the use of their networked information systems. Hence, PA have to ensure an
operativity adherent to rules and laws, tackling problems such as the correct use of the digital signature
and certificates since the administrative acts need to have legal value according to current laws, have to
activate authentication and non repudiation systems for administrative transactions, to have to protect
sensitive data and so on. We just mention the forthcoming application regarding the Electronic Identity
Card and its security implications, that deserves a careful study of policies, attacks, mechanisms and
interoperability measures necessary to perform all identification processing correctly and in a secure
and under transaction survivable protocols.
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